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Abstract
Authentication is one of the foremost goals of many security protocols. It is most often formalised as a form of agreement,
which expresses that the communicating partners agree on the values of a number of variables. In this paper we formalise and study
an intensional form of authentication which we call synchronisation. Synchronisation expresses that the messages are transmitted
exactly as prescribed by the protocol description. Synchronisation is a strictly stronger property than agreement for the standard
intruder model, because it can be used to detect preplay attacks. In order to prevent replay attacks on simple protocols, we also
deﬁne injective synchronisation. Given a synchronising protocol, we show that a sufﬁcient syntactic criterion exists that guarantees
that the protocol is injective as well.
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1. Introduction
The security property studied the most in the ﬁeld of security protocol analysis is authentication. However, contrary
to the requirement of secrecy, there is no general consensus on the meaning of authentication. In fact, as indicated by
Lowe [22], there is a hierarchy of authentication properties, the most popular of which is agreement. Agreement means
that two parties involved in a protocol are guaranteed to agree upon the values of variables after successful completion
of the protocol.
Using terminology from Roscoe [27] agreement is a so-called extensional security property, which means that it
takes into account the effect the protocol achieves. Roscoe observes that it is often hard to provide an extensional
speciﬁcation that exactly captures the requirements of the protocol and detects all relevant attacks. In contrast to
extensional characterisations, intensional characterisations of security properties are induced by the form or structure
of the protocol. Roscoe introduces the notion of canonical intensional speciﬁcation, which expresses that “no node
can believe a protocol run has completed unless a correct series of messages has occurred (consistent as to all the
various parameters) up to and including the last message the given node communicates.” So, it states that all parties
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involved in a protocol, after completion of their role, are convinced that the protocol has been executed according to
its rules.
Roscoe clariﬁes his description of intensional speciﬁcation by providing a sample implementation in CSP. However,
to precisely understand the nature of intensional speciﬁcations, a fundamental approach is beneﬁcial. Therefore, we
formally deﬁne the notion of synchronisation, which is an intensional authentication property requiring that all protocol
messages occur in the expected order with the expected values.
Important to the approach here is that we consider local synchronisation claims. That means that an agent may
decide that the complete protocol has been executed exactly as expected, based on his local observations only. These
observations only take into account the contents of the communications that the agent was involved in. Whenever
such an agent successfully completes a run of a synchronising protocol, all other parties involved in the protocol have
executed their part exactly as expected.
Thus, for a two-party protocol, we have the following informal deﬁnition of synchronisation:
Initiator I considers a protocol synchronising, whenever I as initiator completes a run of the protocol with
responder R, then R as responder has been running the protocol with I . Moreover, all messages are received
exactly as they were sent, in the order as described by the protocol.
This deﬁnition extends in a natural way to multi-party protocols.
It is well-known that such an authentication property may give rise to replay attacks. Consider, e.g. an electronic car
key that sends an encrypted signal to unlock a car. From the view point of the car, this protocol synchronises, since an
intruder cannot construct the encrypted unlock message himself, so it must have been sent by the car key. However,
once the intruder has been able to eavesdrop on the communication between the car key and the car, he can replay the
unlock message and open the car at will. In general, such protocols are ruled out by requiring injective authentication.
For the car key example, it implies that for each time that the car receives an unlock message there must have been
a unique unlock event of the car key. Injectivity is a property that is not captured in Roscoe’s deﬁnition of canonical
intensional speciﬁcations. In order to ﬁll this gap, we introduce injective synchronisation, which, in case of a two-party
protocol informally states the following:
Initiator I considers a protocol injectively synchronising if the protocol synchronises and each run of I
corresponds to a unique run of R.
Most often, security properties, such as agreement, are ﬁrst deﬁned at the conceptual level and then within a speciﬁc
security model (cf. the CSP model in [28]). For our deﬁnition of injective synchronisation we will provide as general
a framework as possible. For instance, we will abstract from the precise contents of the protocol messages, because
we only have to reason about their correspondence. This makes it possible to easily interpret our results in different
security protocol semantics, such as Strand Spaces [31] and Casper/FDR [28], for example.
The framework that we deﬁne also allows us to express injective agreement over all variables in an intensional way,
which makes a formal comparison possible. Injective synchronisation can be shown to be strictly stronger than injective
agreement in the standard intruder model, and thus can be added as top element of Lowe’s authentication hierarchy.
The rather subtle difference between the two can be best explained using so called preplay attacks [24]. Such an attack
occurs if an attacker is able to predict a protocol message and inject it into the system before it was actually created by
the intended sender. Synchronising protocols are not susceptible to preplay attacks, while agreeing protocols possibly
are. Preplay attacks are not very common, and indeed most protocols from the Spore library [29] that satisfy injective
agreement, satisfy injective synchronisation as well.
An application of our treatment is found in the veriﬁcation of injectivity. In practice, many veriﬁcation tools are based
on model checking and make use of a counting argument to verify that a protocol is injective. This will, in general, only
provide an approximation of injectivity. Many other approaches, with some notable exceptions, do not seem to pay
much attention to injectivity. Our formalisation of injective synchronisation allows us to describe a syntactic property
which is sufﬁcient for deciding whether a synchronising protocol is injective. By syntactic, we mean that it can be
directly derived from the syntactic description of the security protocol.
The above mentioned goals lead to the following structure of the present paper. In Section 2 below we gather the
machinery required for our description of security protocols and provide a formal deﬁnition of injective synchronisation.
The relation with injective agreement is described in Section 3. We also explain how Lowe’s authentication hierarchy is
extended. The question of how to verify injective synchronisation is discussed in Section 4. Here, the loop property is
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introduced as a syntactic criterion for verifying injectivity of a synchronising protocol. In Section 5 we discuss related
literature and we close off with some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Model and deﬁnition of synchronisation
In this section we introduce the notions of non-injective synchronisation and injective synchronisation. Synchro-
nisation is based on the property that every successful execution of a protocol by an agent implies that its com-
munication partners exactly follow their roles in the protocol and exchange the intended messages in the intended
order. First, we provide a formal deﬁnition of a security protocol and the order implied on its events, referred to
as protocol events. Next, we postulate a trace semantics involving traces of trace events and introduce the concept
of a cast that captures role instantiations or runs. Finally, we provide the deﬁnition of the two versions of syn-
chronisation. The three-message version of the well-known Needham–Schroeder protocol [25] is used as a running
example.
Deﬁnition 1 (Abstract security protocol). An abstract security protocol P over the set Role is a tuple 〈PE, role,
(≺R )R∈Role,  〉, where
(i) the set PE of protocol events is a disjoint union
PE = SendPE + ReadPE + ClaimPE
of the set SendPE of send protocol events, the set ReadPE of read protocol events, and the set ClaimPE of claim
protocol events;
(ii) the mapping role : PE → Role is the so-called role assignment function of P ;
(iii) for each role R ∈ Role, the relation ≺R is a strict ordering on the set role−1(R);
(iv) the communication relation of P is a 1–1 correspondence between SendPE and ReadPE, i.e., a bijective map
 : SendPE → ReadPE.
The protocol order P of P is deﬁned by
P =
( ⋃
R∈Role
≺R ∪ 
)∗
,
i.e.,P is the least reﬂexive and transitive ordering on PE respecting each role order ≺R as well as the communication
relation. The notation ASP denotes the collection of all abstract security protocols.
The set PE contains, at the level of the protocol description, all the actions to be performed in the protocol.
We distinguish protocol events for sending, reading and claiming. Although one may include other protocol events as
well, e.g. to model internal activity within a role, we do not do so here; the distinction of send protocol events, read
protocol events, and claim events, sufﬁces for our purposes below.
We assume that each protocol event belongs to a single role; some syntactic sugar can be used to distinguish similar
protocol events that belong to different roles. A protocol event is bound to a role via the role description function
role : PE → Role. We impose a (sequential) structure on the set of protocol events belonging to a role R by means of
the total ordering ≺R. Thus, for any role R ∈ Role and ε1, ε2 ∈ PE such that role(ε1) = R and role(ε2) = R we have
that
ε1 ≺R ε2 ∨ ε1 = ε2 ∨ ε1 	R ε2.
In fact, we consider an abstract security protocol P as a collection of communicating sequential processes. Each of the
sequential components is carried by a speciﬁc role. The communication is governed by the communication relation.
This relation prescribes how send protocol events and read protocol events match.We require that for each send protocol
event  there is a unique read protocol event  such that  , and, vice versa, that for each read protocol event  there
is a unique send protocol event  such that  . No unmatched send protocol events nor unmatched read protocol
events are allowed in the abstract protocol P .
Of course, at the level of the trace semantics ofP as introduced below, a strictmatching as given by the communication
relation is not required. For example, in a Dolev–Yao setting where the intruder is capable of intercepting messages,
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Fig. 1. The NS protocol.
unmatched sends may occur in a trace. However, we stress that at the level of an abstract security protocol, its roles and
protocol events, the intruder is not involved. Put otherwise, the abstract security protocol describes what is intended to
happen.
The orderings ≺R on the sets role−1(R) and the communication relation induce naturally an ordering P across
the roles, on the complete set PE of protocol events. For example, a protocol event ε in a role R is considered to occur
before a protocol event ε′ in a role R′ in case there is a send event  of R and a read protocol event  of R′ such that
ε ≺R  ∧   ∧  ≺R′ ε′.
Intuitively, one may requireP to be a partial order, excluding cycles such as εP ε′ ∧ ε′P ε, for different protocol
events ε, ε′. As we do not encounter this in the remainder, the relation P is only required to be a preorder.
We illustrate Deﬁnition 1 with the short version of the Needham–Schroeder protocol, referred to as NS. Throughout
this paper we use Message Sequence Charts (MSC) to illustrate security protocols and attacks. MSC is an ITU-
standardised protocol speciﬁcation language [17]. Fig. 1 contains an MSC of the NS protocol. The initiator I holds
her own secret key skI and the public key pkR of the responder R. Symmetrically, the responder R possesses his own
secret key skR and the public key pkI of the initiator I . The initiator ﬁrst creates a new nonce nI , sends her name I
together with the nonce nI , protected by the public key pkR, to the responder. After receipt of this, the responder
generates a new nonce nR and sends it, together with the earlier nonce nI , covered by the public keypkI to the initiator.
She, in turn, unpacks the message and returns the nonce nR of the responder, encrypted with his public key. Both the
initiator and the responder claim that the authentication property ni-synch, explained below, holds.
We have Role = { I, R } as the set of roles with initiator I and responder R, and for the set of protocol events we put
PE = { sendI→R({I, nI }pkR), readI→R({I, nI }pkR), sendR→I ({nI, nR}pkI ), readR→I ({nI, nR}pkI ),
sendI→R({nR}pkR), readI→R({nR}pkR), claimI (ni-synch), claimR(ni-synch) }
with the following role assignment
role−1(I ) = { sendI→R({I, nI }pkR), readR→I ({nI, nR}pkI ), sendI→R({nR}pkR), claimI (ni-synch) }.
role−1(R) = { readI→R({I, nI }pkR), sendR→I ({nI, nR}pkI ), readI→R({nR}pkR), claimR(ni-synch) }.
Although some syntactical structure is suggested in the choice of protocol events, such as the subscripts of sender and
reader, the payload of a message, including role names and nonces, protected by a public key, this is for presentational
purposes only. A less informative selection of protocol events names, say 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 1 and 2, or similar,
could have been used aswell. The choice of claim protocol events claimI (ni-synch) and claimR(ni-synch) containing the
cryptic ni-synch is used, because the protocol serves as a vehicle to illustrate the notion of non-injective synchronisation,
abbreviated by ni-synch, later.
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The role orderings ≺I and ≺R on the roles I and R, respectively, are as follows:
sendI→R({I, nI }pkR) ≺ I readR→I ({nI, nR}pkI ) ≺I sendI→R({nR}pkR) ≺I claimI (ni-synch)
readI→R({I, nI }pkR) ≺ RsendR→I ({nI, nR}pkI ) ≺R readI→R({nR}pkR) ≺R claimR(ni-synch)
The communication order is given as
sendI→R({I, nI }pkR) readI→R({I, nI }pkR) (1)
sendR→I ({nI, nR}pkI ) readR→I ({nI, nR}pkI ) (2)
sendI→R({nR}pkR) readI→R({nR}pkR). (3)
Note that, on the one hand, we have for the protocol order P of NS that
sendI→R({nR}pkR)P readI→R({nR}pkR)P claimR(ni-synch),
but, on the other hand,
sendI→R({nR}pkR)P readI→R({nR}pkR) P claimI (ni-synch).
Such a situation is relevant to the notion of synchronisation. For the claim claimI (ni-synch) of the initiator role there
are only two preceding pairs of send and read events, viz. those of (1) and (2). For the claim claimR(ni-synch) there
are three preceding communication pairs, viz. those of (1)–(3). We continue the discussion of the Needham–Schroeder
example later, where we will see that the authentication property of synchronisation holds with respect to the claim
claimI (ni-synch) but not for the claim claimR(ni-synch).
For the semantical interpretation of an abstract security protocol, we assume that some trace semantics Tr is given.
It should be noted that this requirement can be relaxed; also other type of semantics can be used instead. For the sake
of presentation we stick to the trace model and refer to the conclusions for a further discussion on this. Let TE be a set
of so-called trace events. As for the collection of protocol events, we assume that the set TE is a disjoint union
TE = SendTE + ReadTE + ClaimTE + IntrTE.
The sets SendTE, ReadTE, and ClaimTE represent trace events for sending, reading and claiming belonging to normal
role behaviour. As internal activity is not taken into account at the protocol level, there are no trace events reﬂecting
this. The elements of the set IntrTE, though, have no counterpart in the set PE. These events, called intruder trace
events, allow us to represent intruder activity.
We postulate a semantical mapping Tr : ASP → P(TE∗), for the collection ASP of abstract security protocols,
mapping an abstract security protocol to a ﬁnite or inﬁnite subset of ﬁnite strings of trace events. For technical
convenience it is assumed that, for an abstract security protocol P , a trace event occurs at most once in a trace
t ∈ Tr(P ). The precise semantics Tr(P ) of a protocol P is not relevant for our treatment of authentication here, and
is left implicit. However, in order to make the coupling of trace events in TE and protocol events in PE explicit, we
assume a partial function
pe : TE → PE
that is deﬁned on the subsets SendTE, ReadTE and ClaimTE, but not on the set IntrTE of trace events representing
malicious activity of the intruder. (Here, f : X → Y denotes a partial function f from a set X to a set Y .) The
mapping pe extends to traces, i.e. sequences of trace events, in a canonical way: pe() =  for  the empty sequence
in TE∗ and PE∗, respectively, pe(e · t) = pe(e) · pe(t) if e ∈ TE\IntrTE, and pe(e · t) = pe(t) if e ∈ IntrTE. The
mapping pe enables us to identify the protocol event to which a trace event corresponds.
Traces consist of complete or partial role executions. A role can be executed multiple times, and in different ways,
which we call the instantiations of the role. A speciﬁc role instantiation is called a run. We assume that there is some
mechanism to distinguish trace events that belong to different runs, and we formalise this by partitioning the set of trace
events. For this purpose, we assume an equivalence relation  on TE\IntrTE, that groups the collection of non-intruder
trace events into runs. We use the notation e1 ∼ e2, for trace events e1, e2 /∈ IntrTE, if these trace events belong to the
same equivalence class of . Similarly, for e ∈ TE\IntrTE, [e] denotes the equivalence class of  containing the trace
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event e. Thus, [e] is the set of all events in the run, or role instance, that contains e. Because a run is an instantiation
of a single role, we have that e ∼ e2 implies role(pe(e1)) = role(pe(e2)).
Furthermore, we assume a mapping
cont : SendTE ∪ ReadTE → Content,
which determines the payload of a send or read event in a trace. The speciﬁc purpose of cont is to establish whether a
send and a read event match regarding the content that was sent and received.
We assume in the model that it is possible that the intruder has compromised a number of agents, e.g. has learnt
their private key. In our examples we will use one such agent E whose private key skE is known to the intruder. This
has a consequence for the evaluation of claims: it is possible that an agent A tries to communicate with the agent E. In
this case, the intruder can of course complete the protocol without E ever being present. If an agent A makes a claim
c about the protocol whilst communicating with E, it will always fail. We call a claim occurring in a communication
with a compromised agent invalid. Of interest is the case in which an agent tries to communicate with agents that are
not compromised by the intruder. We express this distinction with the predicate Valid on claim trace events, that is true
if and only if the claim involves uncompromised agents only. In the typical case, we have that Valid(c) holds if the
intended communication partners do not include E, as we will see in the example.
Typically, trace events are given by amore detailed syntax than protocol events are. For example, while distinguishing
sends, reads and claims, one might feel the need to attach senders and readers to the send and read event, resulting in
constructs as sendA→B and readA→B . Such communications may further have some content involving identities like
A, B and E or nonces like 123 and 456. A construct as {x}pkA represents, as usual, that x is encrypted by the public key
of party A. Below, the distinction between role events like sendI→R and readI→R , on the one hand, and trace events
like sendA→B and readA→B , on the other hand, is stressed in the notation.
For the Needham–Schroeder protocol discussed above, the trace representing the well-known Lowe attack [20] can
have the form
sendA→E({A, 123}pkE) · takeA→E({A, 123}pkE) · fakeA→B({A, 123}pkB) ·
readA→B({A, 123}pkB) · sendB→A({123, 456}pkA) · takeB→A({123, 456}pkA) ·
fakeE→A({123, 456}pkA) · readE→A({123, 456}pkA) · sendA→E({456}pkE) ·
claimA(ni-synch) · takeA→E({456}pkE) · fakeA→B({456}pkB) ·
readA→B({456}pkB) · claimB(ni-synch).
Note, for the particular choice of trace semantics here, the presence of take and fake actions in the former trace that
model intruder activity. It is assumed that the intruder knows the private key of E, so that he can act as man-in-the-
middle. Because A tries to communicate with the compromised agent E, we have that ¬Valid(claimA). Of interest is
the claim of B: we have that Valid(claimB).
A realistic choice for pe maps the trace to the sequence of protocol events
sendI→R({I, nI }pkR) ·
readI→R({I, nI }pkR) · sendR→I ({nI, nR}pkI ) ·
readR→I ({nI, nR}pkI ) · sendI→R({nR}pkR) ·
claimI (ni-synch) ·
readI→R({nR}pkR) · claimR(ni-synch).
As the partial function pe is not deﬁned on intruder trace events, they have vanished in the latter representation of the
trace at the level of protocol events. In this trace, two role instances (runs) are involved. Thus, an equivalence relation 
for Tr(P ) will distinguish the following subsets of trace events:
{ sendA→E({A, 123}pkE), readE→A({123, 456}pkA), sendA→E({456}pkE), claimA(ni-synch) }
{ readA→B({A, 123}pkB), sendB→A({123, 456}pkA), readA→B({456}pkB), claimB(ni-synch) }. (4)
For a trace t ∈ TE∗, we write ti for the ith element of t . We use <t to denote the strict trace ordering of t , i.e. ti <t tj
if i < j . The subscript is omitted from the notation <t , if the trace t is clear from the context. Furthermore, for a trace
event e, we write e ∈ t in case e = ti for some index i.
The various notions of authentication discussed in this paper capture the interaction of the agents involved in the
protocol. In general, the semantics allow for several protocol instances in a single trace in which several parties are
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involved. Typically, there are more parties than roles in a trace. Also, it can be very well the case that the same party is
involved many times, possibly in different roles. Central is the question of who is doing what with whom. I.e., who are,
from the perspective of a party involved in a particular protocol instance in a particular trace, the other parties involved
in the protocol instance and in which roles?
The above is speciﬁcally relevant to the occurrences of claim trace events, as these events are intended to signify a
moment in the trace where authentication has been established. Therefore, we introduce the notion of a cast, borrowing
intuition from a theater play that is performed several times. The cast for a particular performance of the play relates
activity in the performance to particular roles. Likewise, the concrete activities in a protocol instance at the trace level,
are assigned to the roles in the protocol. In the theater case, in different performances an actor can play different roles.
Also, the same role can be taken up, for different performances of the play, by different actors. Likewise, trace events
associated with different roles may belong to the same agent and trace events that are instances for the same role may
belong to different agents. For our purposes the coupling of roles and trace events is more important than the coupling
of roles and actors. Therefore, we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 (Cast). A mapping  : ClaimTE → Role → P(TE) is called a cast function for the protocol P if
e ∈ (c)(R) ⇒ role(pe(e)) = R ∧ (c)(R) ⊆ [e], (5)
for all e ∈ TE, c ∈ ClaimTE and R ∈ Role, and
c ∈ (c)(role(c)). (6)
for all c ∈ ClaimTE. (Recall that role(c) expands to role(pe(c)) when c is a trace event.)
A cast function  : ClaimTE → Role → P(TE) is called an injective cast function, if
(c)(R) = (c′)(R′) ⇒ c = c′ ∧ R = R′
for every two claim trace events c, c′ and every two roles R, R′. We use Cast(P ) to denote the collection of all cast
functions for the protocol P .
The idea behind the notion of a cast function is the assignment of roles in the context of a concrete claim event c.
The image (c) of  for c is a mapping from Role to P(TE). The subset (c)(R) of TE consists of a number of trace
events corresponding, in this cast, to the role R and falling within the same equivalence class of the partitioning , as
captured by condition (5). In particular, we require in condition (6) the claim event c to be one of the events attributed
to the role of the claim. Note the inclusion (c)(R) ⊆ [e] above. At this point, we do not require that every role will
be performed completely, leaving room for unﬁnished role executions.
An injective cast function is, with abuse of language, an injective mapping when considered to be of functionality
ClaimTE × Role → P(TE), rather than injective as a function of type ClaimTE → Role → P(TE). The main reason
of sticking to the latter function type is the underlying intuition of a cast. The mapping (c) captures the perspective of
the agent executing the instance of the role of the claim trace event c. From the point of view of the particular role of
the agent, he expects certain activity to belong to particular roles, like, for the Needham–Schroeder case, “apparently
agent A want to set up a session with me using nonce 123” or “it must be the case that the initiator has received my
response, for otherwise my nonce 456 would not have returned”.
In the context of the Lowe attack trace introduced above, we have, e.g., as a cast the mapping  such that
(claimA(ni-synch))(I ) = { sendA→E({A, 123}pkE),
readE→A({123, 456}pkA), sendA→E({456}pkE), claimA(ni-synch) }
(claimA(ni-synch))(R) = { takeA→E({A, 123}pkE),
fakeE→A({123, 456}pkA), takeA→E({456}pkE) }
(claimB(ni-synch))(I ) = { sendA→E({A, 123}pkE),
readE→A({123, 456}pkA), sendA→E({456}pkE), claimA(ni-synch) }
(claimB(ni-synch))(R) = { readA→B({A, 123}pkB),
sendB→A({123, 456}pkA), readA→B({456}pkB), claimB(ni-synch) }.
Note that, the cast  is bounded by the general restrictions of Deﬁnition 2 and the particular choice for the equiv-
alence  (see formula (4)). For the claim trace event claimA(ni-synch) regarding the initiator role I , and the claim
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trace event claimB(ni-synch) regarding the responder role R, the images do not differ among different casts. For the
trace under consideration, there are for (claimA(ni-synch))(R) and (claimB(ni-synch))(I ), in principle alternatives.
Because of the limited trace we consider, for (claimB(ni-synch))(I ) this amounts to the same set of trace events. For
(claimA(ni-synch))(R) the less plausible sequence comprising (claimB(ni-synch))(R) would do as well.
Regarding the ﬁrst two clauses above, the completely genuine trace events of agent A are matched by activity of
the intruder (who is assumed to have access to the private key of agent E). Just bad luck for agent A, but when
takes and fakes are interpreted as reads and sends, nothing strange happens. Agent A, however, cannot distinguish
between these two cases. The situation for the latter two clauses is more seriously wrong. Here, the role of responder
of agent B, who assumes he is talking to agent A, is matched by activity of agent A engaged in a protocol session with
agent E.
We now return to the main point of this paper: deﬁning a strong form of authentication. We have established an
abstract view on security protocol descriptions, and a second layer of trace events. We introduce an authentication
property that captures the following correspondence: at the trace level, we require that the same structures occur as the
ones found at the protocol description level. Informally put, we require that everything we intended to happen in the
protocol description also actually happens in the trace.
We ﬁrst give the deﬁnition of the authentication property that we call non-injective synchronisation, and explain it
in detail below.
Deﬁnition 3 (NI-SYNCH). A protocolP with a claim protocol event  is called non-injectively synchronising, notation
NI-SYNCH(P, ), if
∀ t ∈ Tr(P ) ∃ ∈ Cast(P ) ∀c ∈ t, Valid(c), pe(c) = 
∀,  :  P  ∃s, r : s <t r <t c
pe(s) =  ∧ s ∈ (c)(role()) ∧
pe(r) =  ∧ r ∈ (c)(role()) ∧
cont(s) = cont(r).
Non-injective synchronisation is a trace property for a protocol P and a claim role event . In particular, each trace
t of the protocol P can contain a number of instances of the claim event . We only consider the valid instances of
these claims, i.e. the claims of agents that communicate with agents that have not been compromised. For each of these
instances of the claim, we require that there are actual communication partners. Thus, for all of these claims, there
must exist runs that fulﬁll the roles of the protocol. This is expressed by the existence of the  function, which assigns
the communication partner runs for each claim instance and role of the protocol.
Given an assignment of communication partners by the cast function , we require, for each claim instance c, that
the communications have occurred as expected. This requirement must hold for each communication pair (s, r) that
precedes the claim role event, expressed as ∀,  :  P .
In order for the communication   to have occurred correctly from the viewpoint of the claim trace event c, there
must exist actual send and read events s and r , such that the following three conditions for correct communications
hold: the order of the events must be correct, the events are instantiations of the right role events by the runs as deﬁned
in , and the message must be communicated correctly.
For the ﬁrst condition regarding the ordering in the trace, we require that just as in the protocol description, s <t
r <t c holds. The second condition requires that the trace events are indeed the events corresponding to the correct
read and send events from the protocol, and that they are part of the runs as assigned by the  function. For the third
condition, we simply require that the contents of the read message must be identical to the content of the sent message.
Concretely, for the case of the Needham–Schroeder protocol NS, we have that NI-SYNCH does not hold for the
claim event claimR(ni-synch) of the responder. Consider again the trace
sendA→E({A, 123}pkE) · takeA→E({A, 123}pkE) · fakeA→B({A, 123}pkB) ·
readA→B({A, 123}pkB) · sendB→A({123, 456}pkA) · takeB→A({123, 456}pkA) ·
fakeE→A({123, 456}pkA) · readE→A({123, 456}pkA) · sendA→E({456}pkE) ·
claimA(ni-synch) · takeA→E({456}pkE) · fakeA→B({456}pkB) ·
readA→B({456}pkB) · claimB(ni-synch)
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representing the Lowe attack considered before. We want to show that for this trace, there exists no cast for the
claim trace event claimB(ni-synch) that satisﬁes NI-SYNCH . Given the clustering of trace events prescribed by the
partitioning  and the requirement (6) of Deﬁnition 2, we have
(claimB(ni-synch))(R) = { readA→B({A, 123}pkB),
sendB→A({123, 456}pkA), readA→B({456}pkB), claimB(ni-synch) }.
We have as single possibility of (claimB(ni-synch))(I ), by condition (5) of Deﬁnition 2,
(claimB(ni-synch))(I ) = { sendA→E({A, 123}pkE),
readE→A({123, 456}pkA), sendA→E({456}pkE), claimA(ni-synch) }.
However, none of the two read trace events will have counterparts in the run (claimB(ni-synch))(I ) that match in
content (assuming the public keys pkB and pkE being different) as is required by the fact that
sendI→R({I, nI }pkR) readI→R({I, nI }pkR)P claimR(ni-synch) ∧
sendI→R({nR}pkR) readI→R({nR}pkR)P claimR(ni-synch).
On the other hand, it is to be expected thatNI-SYNCH(NS, claimI (ni-synch)) holds. For the particular trace considered,
the cast function  given as an instance of Deﬁnition 2 allows for a matching of the trace events corresponding to the
protocol events preceding the claim claimI (ni-synch). However, for non-injective synchronisation to be satisﬁed, such
a cast should exist for all traces in Tr(NS), which we did not fully detail here.
Protocols that satisfy NI-SYNCH can still be vulnerable to so-called replay attacks, which will be explored in more
detail in Section 4.1. Therefore, we modify NI-SYNCH slightly and require that the cast function is injective, yielding
the notion of injective synchronisation.
Deﬁnition 4 (I-SYNCH). A protocol P with a claim protocol event  is called injectively synchronising, notation
I-SYNCH(P, ), if
∀ t ∈ Tr(P ) ∃ ∈ Cast(P ), injective ∀c ∈ t, Valid(c), pe(c) = 
∀,  :  P  ∃s, r : s <t r <t c
pe(s) =  ∧ s ∈ (c)(role()) ∧
pe(r) =  ∧ r ∈ (c)(role()) ∧
cont(s) = cont(r).
For the Needham–Schroeder protocol in Fig. 1, I-SYNCH holds for the role I in the Dolev–Yao model: for each
instance of the claim of role I in a trace, there must also be a unique instance of the role R to synchronise with.
3. Extending the authentication hierarchy
In [22], Lowe deﬁned a number of authentication properties and positioned them in a hierarchy. In this section we
study the relation between these properties and our notion of (injective) synchronisation. Since time is not considered
in our model, we will restrict our attention to authentication properties not involving time.
3.1. Agreement
The deﬁnitions provided by Lowe are all in an extensional style. For instance, agreement expresses that after
successful completion of the protocol the parties agree on the values of all (or some) variables. In order to be able to
compare this to our approach, a common framework is required. For this purpose, we tune the deﬁnitions of [22] here,
to provide an intensional characterisation of agreement, to arrange for such a comparison. From these deﬁnitions it
easily follows that injective synchronisation is stronger than injective agreement over all variables, and thus forms a
new top element in the authentication hierarchy. Using these insights, we are able to show the difference between the
several forms of authentication by means of some simple examples.
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The starting point for providing an intensional characterisation of agreement is the following deﬁnition of injective
agreement by Lowe [22].
Initiator I is in agreement with responder R, whenever I as initiator completes a run of the protocol with R, then
R as responder has been running the protocol with I . Moreover, I and R agree on all data variables, and each
run of I corresponds to a unique run of R.
Although this deﬁnition is conceptually clear, it is still informal. Therefore, we will analyse this deﬁnition and
translate the given concepts into our framework.
The main issue to be clariﬁed is the notion of a variable, which is not deﬁned in our approach. Since the values of
the variables are determined by the contents of the messages sent and received, we can reformulate the correspondence
between the variables as a requirement on the contents of the sent and received messages. In a two-party protocol, it is
clearly the case that if two parties agree on the values of all variables, then they agree on the contents of all messages
exchanged, and vice versa.
Agreement in a multi-party protocol means that only the initiator and the responder agree on their shared variables.
There is no such requirement for the variables maintained by the other roles in the protocol. In order to be able to
provide an intensional deﬁnition of agreement, we will have to extend the agreement relation to all parties involved
in the protocol. Therefore, we will require that upon completion of the protocol all parties agree on all variables.
This is somewhat stronger than the extensional deﬁnition provided by Lowe, but for many multi-party protocols this
seems to be a natural extension. Summarising, we see that the agreement requirement translates to the demand that
corresponding sends and receives have the same contents.
Given this interpretation of agreement, it is easy to see the correspondence with synchronisation. Like agreement,
synchronisation requires correspondence on the contents of all messages, but it additionally requires that a message is
sent before it can be received. The deﬁnition of Lowe does not bother about this send/read order. Thus, we arrive at the
following deﬁnition of non-injective agreement, which is adapted from Deﬁnition 3 by removing the requirement that
send events occur before their corresponding read event.
Deﬁnition 5 (NI-AGREE). Given a protocol P with a claim protocol event , non-injective agreement holds, notation
NI-AGREE(P, ), if
∀ t ∈ Tr(P ) ∃ ∈ Cast(P ) ∀c ∈ t, Valid(c), pe(c) = 
∀,  :  P  ∃s, r : s <t c ∧ r <t c
pe(s) =  ∧ s ∈ (c)(role()) ∧
pe(r) =  ∧ r ∈ (c)(role()) ∧
cont(s) = cont(r).
The agreement predicate expresses that for all instantiated claims in any trace of a given security protocol, there exist
runs for the other roles in the protocol, such that all communication events causally preceding the claim must have
occurred before the claim.
Injective agreement is deﬁned in the same way as injective synchronisation is obtained from non-injective synchro-
nisation.
Deﬁnition 6 (I-AGREE). Given a protocol P with a claim protocol event , injective agreement holds, notation
I-AGREE(P, ), if
∀ t ∈ Tr(P ) ∃ ∈ Cast(P ), injective ∀c ∈ t, Valid(c), pe(c) = 
∀,  :  P  ∃s, r : s <t c ∧ r <t c
pe(s) =  ∧ s ∈ (c)(role()) ∧
pe(r) =  ∧ r ∈ (c)(role()) ∧
cont(s) = cont(r).
It expresses that for any trace and for any run of any role in the protocol there exist unique runs for the other roles of
the protocol such that for all claims occurring in the trace all communications preceding the claim must have occurred
correctly within these runs.
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Fig. 2. Hierarchy of security properties.
Fig. 3. Distinguishing protocols.
The deﬁnition of I-AGREE does not involve all communications, but only the set of events that causally precede a
claim. However, it turns out that the way in which agreement is made precise in terms of CSP, as can be checked by
compiling Casper-code into CSP, it also takes only preceding communications into account. For this, running-commit
signals (see [28]) are introduced in the protocol. For each role, a running signal is added to the last communication
preceding the agreement claim. In the role that includes the claim, a commit signal is added to the last communication.
Injective agreement over all roles requires that the running signals of each role precede the commit signal. This
corresponds to the order requirements of I-AGREE.
The deﬁnitions of the four security properties above, clearly reveal their relative strengths in excluding attacks. Every
injective protocol is also non-injective and if a protocol satisﬁes synchronisation then it satisﬁes agreement too. Fig. 2
shows this hierarchy. An arrow from property X to property Y means that every protocol satisfying X also satisﬁes Y .
Phrased differently, the class of protocols satisfying X is included in the class satisfying Y .
The correctness of the hierarchy is captured by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The security properties I-SYNCH , NI-SYNCH, I-AGREE, and NI-AGREE satisfy the inclusion relation
as depicted in Fig. 2.
Proof. Straightforward from the deﬁnitions. 
The question of whether the inclusions in Fig. 2 are strict is more difﬁcult to answer. In part, this is due to the abs-
tractness of our model. Since our approach is parameterised over the actual semantics, and thus over the intruder model,
we cannot determine for a given protocol to which class it belongs. Therefore, strictness of the inclusions can only be
answered relative to a given semantics. Consequently, the following reasoning will be at a conceptual level only.
If we take, e.g., a model where all agents simply follow their roles and the intruder has no capabilities at all, then the
diamond in Fig. 2 collapses into a single class. The same holds if the intruder can only eavesdrop on the communications.
However, in the Dolev–Yao model, all inclusions are strict, as we will see below.
The case of injectivity vs. non-injectivity has been studied extensively before. The MSC on the left in Fig. 3 shows
a protocol that satisﬁes NI-SYNCH and NI-AGREE, but neither I-SYNCH nor I-AGREE.
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The intruder will only be able to construct message {I, R}skI after having eavesdropped this message from a previous
run. Therefore, every read event of this message is preceded by a corresponding send event, so the protocol is both
NI-SYNCH and NI-AGREE. However, once the intruder has learnt this message, he can replay it as often as desired,
so the protocol is not injective.
A distinguishing example between synchronisation and agreement is depicted on the right in Fig. 3. As conﬁrmed
by the Casper/FDR tool set, this protocol satisﬁes unilateral authentication in the sense of agreement (both injective
and non-injective). However, the protocol does not satisfy synchronisation (both variants). This is the case, because the
intruder can send message I, R long before I actually initiates the protocol, making R to believe that I has requested
the start of a session before he actually did.
The two examples show that the inclusions of the diamond in Fig. 2 are strict if the intruder has the capabilities to
eavesdrop, deﬂect and inject messages. Both examples also imply that there are no arrows between NI-SYNCH and
I-AGREE.
3.2. Synchronisation vs. agreement
As stated before, the difference between synchronisation and agreement is rather subtle and, indeed, most authenti-
cation protocols in practice satisfy both properties. The distinction is that synchronisation requires that corresponding
send and receive messages have to be executed in the expected order, while for agreement a message may be received
before it is sent. This can, for instance, be caused by a message injection of the intruder. An attack in which the intruder
injects amessage before its actual creation is called a preplay attack.Whether such a protocol weakness can be exploited
by the attacker depends on the intention of the protocol. Below we will sketch three examples of possible weaknesses.
In the ﬁrst examplewe consider the notion of predictable nonces. Theremay be several reasons for such predictability,
such as a bad pseudo-random generator, or the fact that the nonce is implemented as a counter. Consider, for instance,
the protocol in Fig. 4. The purpose of this protocol is unilateral authentication of responder R towards initiator I . This
is established by using nonce nI as a challenge. However, if the value of this nonce is predictable by the intruder, the
protocol has a major shortcoming. This is shown in the trace in the right of Fig. 4, which displays that the run of R
has ﬁnished even before the run of I started. The consequences of this preplay attack are similar to many well-known
replay attacks. The protocol satisﬁes (injective and non-injective) agreement, but does not satisfy synchronisation (both
variants).
This type of preplay attacks is also called suppress-replay attacks [14,24]. As pointed out by Chen and Mitchell
[24], practical protocols such as the S/KEY user authentication scheme suffer from this kind of attack because they use
predictable challenges. Roscoe [27] found a similar problem for the Needham–Schroeder Secret Key protocol in the
case that the initiator’s nonce is predictable.
The second example concerns the protocol in Fig. 5, in which we assume that an agent keeps a state which is shared
by all its instances of the protocol. The purpose of this protocol is again unilateral authentication, but now the responder
Fig. 4. Preplay attack due to a predictable nonce.
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Fig. 5. Preplay attack because the nonce is controlled by the responder.
is in control of the nonce. After receiving a request from the initiator, the responder sends his nonce to the initiator.
The initiator keeps a set V in which he stores all nonces from previous instantiations of the protocol. This is to prevent
replay attacks and, thus, to ensure injectivity. If the nonce is accepted as fresh, the initiator challenges the responder to
prove his identity, which the responder does by replying the signed nonce. This may seem a reasonable authentication
protocol, and indeed it satisﬁes injective agreement. However, the preplay attack shown in Fig. 5 indicates a weakness
of the protocol. An initiator can successfully execute his side of the protocol, while the responder was not even alive
when the initiator started the protocol. This example shows that even a complex message interaction can be preplayed.
Since the protocol does not satisfy synchronisation, this weakness can be detected by verifying synchronisation.
Two remarks apply to this example. The ﬁrst remark is that testingwhether the nonce is already inV and the extension
of V with the nonce should be implemented as an atomic action (a test-and-set action) to achieve the desired result. The
second remark is that this protocol still has interesting properties when leaving out the validation of nR’s freshness by
the initiator (i.e. if we remove the set V and its operations). The resulting protocol is not injective anymore, since the
intrudermay replay the responder behaviour of an earlier run of the protocol.However, this reduced protocol still satisﬁes
non-injective agreement. Since the displayed attack remains possible, the protocol does not satisfy synchronisation.
Thus, we have a stateless protocol suffering from a preplay attack. It satisﬁes non-injective agreement but it does not
satisfy non-injective synchronisation.
In the previous two examples we have seen how the intruder can preplay a complete protocol session and use it later
to fool the initiator into thinking that the responder is still alive. In the third example, we see that it can already be
harmful if only a single message is preplayed by the intruder.
In Fig. 6 R is an Internet Service Provider, used by I . Assume that I pays R for the time he is connected. When
I wants to connect, R retrieves the certiﬁcate of I from the trusted server S and uses this to authenticate I . After a
successful session, I is billed from the moment the ﬁrst message was received by R.
This protocol is a slightlymodiﬁed version of theNeedham–Schroeder–Lowe protocol. It can be exploited as follows.
An intruder can send the ﬁrst message preemptively, causing R to initiate a session with what it believes is I . If at
some later time I decides to initiate a session with R and ﬁnishes it successfully, I will receive a bill that is too high.
In fact, although, this protocol satisﬁes agreement for R, the ﬁrst message is not authenticated at all. In contrast, this
protocol does not satisfy synchronisation. The protocol can be easily modiﬁed to satisfy NI-SYNCH and thus to be
resilient against the sketched type of timing attacks.
This type of attack may seem of little relevance, but it depends on the interpretation of the messages whether such
unexpected behaviour can cause harm or not. In the rather contrived example above, a typical interpretation of the
messages concerning billing time allows the intruder to exploit this unexpected behaviour. Following the observations
of Roscoe [27], this sort of behaviour, while seemingly innocent, was certainly unexpected by the protocol designer.
152 C.J.F. Cremers et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 139–161
Fig. 6. A protocol satisfying NI-AGREE but not NI-SYNCH.
After ﬁnding such unexpected behaviour, the designer has two options. First, he may decide that this behaviour is
acceptable, but then he has to take the implications of this behaviour into account and extend his mental model of the
protocol. He should make sure that this behaviour does not interfere with any other analysis which is based on the
intended order of the protocol events. Still, according to Roscoe, the second option is to strengthen the protocol as to
make it compatible with the mental model again. As pointed out by Roscoe, the TMN protocol, and a seemingly correct
strengthening thereof, suffer from the same weakness as the protocol in Fig. 6.
We conclude by stating that failure of a protocol to respect synchronisation does not always indicate an exploitable
weakness of the protocol. However, such unexpected behaviour should always receive extra attention and should at
least lead to adjusting the mental model of the protocol.
4. Verifying injective synchronisation
Several tools exist to verify whether a protocol satisﬁes some form of agreement, e.g. [21,3,30]. Because synchro-
nisation is very similar to agreement, we expect that it will be feasible to adapt most of the veriﬁcation tools to be able
to handle at least non-injective synchronisation.
In reﬁnement or forward model-checking approaches, agreement is commonly veriﬁed by inserting running and
commit or similar signals in the protocol. When somebody commits to some values, the other party needs to have
emitted a running signal. The commit signal corresponds to the claim in our framework, whereas the running sig-
nal denotes the last communication of the other role that causally precedes the claim. These signals are introduced
to ease veriﬁcation: instead of having to inspect the trace leading up to the claim, only the set of emitted sig-
nals needs to be inspected. In our framework, agreement is a property of the trace preﬁx ending in a claim. By
introducing running and commit signals, agreement can be veriﬁed by inspecting the set of signals. In much the
same way, it is possible to verify synchronisation by introducing such signals for each communication that precedes
the claim.
We have developed a protocol veriﬁcation tool that can verify non-injective agreement and non-injective synchroni-
sation as deﬁned here (see [6]). The tool can compute trace preﬁxes of a protocol leading up to a claim. Given such a
trace preﬁx, veriﬁcation involves checking whether a suitable  exists such that the communications have occurred as
expected.
In order to verify injective agreement, many tools rely on a counting argument: if a trace preﬁx contains n commit
signals, there should be at least n preceding running signals in the trace preﬁx. If enough commit signals are considered
in this way, this should ensure injectivity. The main drawback of this method is that the veriﬁcation complexity
is exponential in the length of the traces, and thus in the number of running claims considered. Another approach to
verifying injectivity uses detailed knowledge of the data model: if the agreement includes data items that are guaranteed
to be unique for each instance of the claim, injectivity can be derived. However, not all injective protocols include such
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unique data items. In some cases it can also be non-trivial to establish the required uniqueness property, as we show in
the next section.
This section will focus on the veriﬁcation of injectivity for protocols that satisfy non-injective synchronisation.
We propose and study a property, the LOOP property, that can be syntactically veriﬁed. We prove a theorem that shows
that LOOP is sufﬁcient to guarantee injectivity. Our result is generic in the sense that it holds for a wide range of
security protocol models, and does not depend on the details of message content or nonce freshness.
The remainder of this section will proceed as follows. In Section 4.1 we elaborate on the difﬁculties posed by
injectivity, and informally describe our theorem. In Section 4.2 we deﬁne a class of security protocol models for which
our theorem holds. Then, in Section 4.3 we propose and study the LOOP property, and prove the main theorem.
4.1. Injectivity of synchronisation
As stated in Section 1, protocols satisfying non-injective synchronisation may still be vulnerable to so-called replay
attacks. In a replay attack the intruder replays a message taken from a different context, thereby fooling the honest
participants into thinking they have successfully completed the protocol run (see [23]).
The left-hand protocol in Fig. 7 shows an example of a protocol where the parties agree upon the values of the
variables (i.e., nonce nR), while the right-hand scenario shows a replay attack on this protocol. The intruder can
overhear the message sent and can fool I in a future run to think that R has sent this message.
In order to rule out such ﬂawed protocols, the additional property of injectivity is required. The unilateral authenti-
cation protocol from Fig. 7 clearly does not satisfy injectivity, as is shown by the replay attack in the right-hand side
of the ﬁgure. A simple ﬁx would be to have the initiator determine the value of the nonce, as in Fig. 8.
Fig. 7. An authentication protocol that is vulnerable to a replay attack.
Fig. 8. Fixing the injectivity problem.
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The introduction of a causal chain of messages from the initiator to the responder and back to the initiator seems
to do the trick. We will call such a chain a loop. The presence of such a loop plays a key role in the discussion on
injectivity below.
It is folklore that a nonce handshake is sufﬁcient to ensure injectivity. Here we identify a more abstract property,
viz. the occurrence of a loop, which is independent of the data model, and thus applicable to a wide range of security
protocol models. To give an indication of the limitations of the data based approach, consider a protocol where a nonce
n is created, and some function is applied to it. The result f (n) is sent to the responder, who applies another function
and replies with g(f (n)). Now, to check whether such a protocol can be injective based on the freshness of n in a
data-based model, we need to know some details of f and g. If for example f (x) = x mod 2, the protocol will not be
injective. Therefore, we propose to only reason about loops, which does not require any information about the contents
of messages.
In the next subsection we study the question whether there is a method to validate injectivity of a security protocol
which is generic in the sense that it can be applied within a large class of veriﬁcation methodologies, regardless of the
data model that is used. Our main result is that, for a large class of security protocol semantics, the LOOP property
introduced above guarantees that a synchronising protocol is also injective.
4.2. A class of security protocol models
The class of security protocol semantics for which our result holds, is characterised by the closure of the set of
execution traces under swapping of events. This class contains, e.g. the process algebraic approach with the standard
Dolev–Yao intruder model. Apart from this swap property, we will need no other assumptions on the data model and
the intruder model. Since the LOOP property can easily be veriﬁed by means of static analysis of the security protocol
description, we provide, in fact, a practical syntactic criterion for verifying injectivity.
We introduce the notation t = u1; u2 to denote that t is a concatenation of trace event sequences u1 and u2.
Deﬁnition 7 (Swap). A security protocol semantics satisﬁes the SWAP property if the following two conditions
hold:
(i) The trace set Tr(P ) is closed with respect to non-read swaps, i.e. for all trace events e′ such that pe(e′) ∈ ReadPE
it holds that
t; e; e′; t ′ ∈ Tr(P ) ∧ e ∼ e′ ⇒ t; e′; e; t ′ ∈ Tr(P )
for all trace events e and traces t, t ′.
(ii) The trace set Tr(P ) is closed with respect to read swaps, i.e. for s, r, e with pe(s) ∈ SendPE, pe(r) ∈ ReadPE we
have that
t; s; t ′; e; r; t ′′ ∈ Tr(P ) ∧ cont(s) = cont(r) ∧ e ∼ r ⇒ t; s; t ′; r; e; t ′′ ∈ Tr(P )
for all traces t, t ′, t ′′.
These properties state that we can shift a non-read event to the left as long as it does not cross any other events of the
same role instance. For the read event we have an additional constraint: we can only shift it to the left if there remains
an earlier send of the same message.
For the remainder of this section we assume the protocol P contains a claim . We introduce a predicate 
and a set ′ for protocols that satisfy non-injective agreement for this claim . Given a trace t , a claim event c,
and a cast  that maps the roles to runs, we express the auxiliary predicate  on the domain Tr(P ) × Cast(P ) ×
ClaimTE by
(t,, c) ⇐⇒ pe(c) =  ∧
∀,  :   ∧ P  ∃s, r : s <t r <t c
pe(s) =  ∧ s ∈ (c)(role()) ∧
pe(r) =  ∧ r ∈ (c)(role()) ∧
cont(s) = cont(r).
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The ﬁrst conjunct of this predicate expresses the fact that the run executing the claim role is determined by the
parameter c. The second conjunct expresses that in the trace t , the claim c is valid with respect to the speciﬁc cast ,
i.e. that the partners have executed all communications as expected. In the formula this is expressed by the fact that
send and read events are executed by the expected runs, viz. (c)(role(pe(s))) and (c)(role(pe(r))), respectively,
with identical contents, and in the right order.
Given a valid synchronisation claim c in a trace t , there exists a role instantiation function  such that (t,, c)
holds. The predicate  tells us that certain events exist in the trace. Because we want to reason about these events in
the following, we decide to make this set of events explicit. We deﬁne the set of events ′(t,, c) by
′(t,, c) = { e ∈ t | e ∈ (c)(role(e)) ∧ pe(e)P pe(c) }.
Assuming that  holds, its set of events ′ has two interesting properties. If there is a read in this set, there is also a
matching send in the set. Furthermore, given an event of a role in the set, all preceding events of the same role are also
in the set.
To prove our main result, the SWAP property from Deﬁnition 7 sufﬁces. However, to ease the explanation of the
proof, we introduce two additional lemmas. These lemmas are implied by the model and the two swap conditions.
The ﬁrst lemma generalises the swapping of two events to the swapping of a set of events. The lemma does not hold
for any set of events: we now use results obtained for a set of events deﬁned by , that are involved in a synchronisation
claim. Based on the two swap properties, we can shift these events (in their original order) to the beginning of the trace.
This trace transformation function shift : P(TE) × TE∗ → TE∗ is deﬁned by
shift(E, t) =
{
t if t ∩ E = ∅,
e; shift(E, u1; u2) if t = u1; e; u2 ∧ u1 ∩ E = ∅ ∧ e ∈ E.
Here, the intersection of a trace and a set yields the collection of elements of the set occurring in the trace. This function
effectively reorders a trace. The next lemma formulates conditions assuring that the reordering of a trace in Tr(P ) is
in Tr(P ) as well.
Lemma 1. Given a protocol P and a trace t ∈ Tr(P ), claim event c and role instantiation function :
(t,, c) ∧ t ′ = shift(′(t,, c), t) ⇒ t ′ ∈ Tr(P ) ∧ (t ′,, c).
Proof. Induction on the size of the ﬁnite set ′(t,, c), because (t,, c) implies that the read events can be swapped.
Recall that, by convention, each event occurs at most once in a trace. 
The lemma directly generalises to more claim instances (of the same claim). Thus, instead of a single claim run,
we can consider sets of claim runs.
Lemma 2. Given a trace t , a set of claim events C ⊆ t and cast  ∈ Cast(P ):
(∀c ∈ C : (t,, c)) ∧ t ′ = shift
(⋃
c∈C
′(t,, c), t
)
⇒ t ′ ∈ Tr(P ) ∧ (∀c ∈ C : (t ′,, c)).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1. 
If we apply the shift function to a trace of the system, and the conditions of the lemma are met, we get a reordered
trace, that is also in Tr(P ). The new trace consists of two segments: in the ﬁrst segment there are only the preceding
events of the claim events in C, and all other events are in the second segment.
Intuitively, these lemmas express that the events involved in a valid synchronisation claim are independent of the
other events in the trace. A valid synchronisation can occur at any point in the trace, because it does not require the
involvement of other runs, or of the intruder. However, other events in the trace might depend on events involved in the
synchronisation. Although we cannot shift the synchronising events to the right, we can shift them to the left, which
ensures that any dependencies will not be broken.
We use Lemmas 1 and 2 in the injectivity proof in the next section.
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4.3. The LOOP property
We deﬁne a property of protocols, which we call the LOOP property. For protocols with only two roles, it resembles
a ping-pong property. First the claim role executes an event, then the other role, and then the claim role again. For
example, the LOOP property does not hold for the protocol in Fig. 7, but it does hold for the protocols in Figs. 8 and 1.
We generalise this for multi-party protocols with any number of roles. We require that the partner roles have an event
that must occur after the start of the claim run, but before the claim event itself.
Deﬁnition 8. A security protocol P has the LOOP property with respect to a claim  if
∀ εP , role(ε) = role() ∃ε′, ε′′ : ε′P ε′′P  ∧ role(ε′) = role() ∧ role(ε′′) = role(ε). (7)
The property tells us that for each role that has an event ε that precedes the claim , there exists a loop from the claim
role to the role and back. This structure is identiﬁed in the formula by ε′P ε′′P .
Lemma 3. Given a security protocol P with a claim : If all roles R = role() that have events preceding , start with
a read event, then we have that LOOP(P, ).
The proof of this lemma follows from the deﬁnition of the protocol orderP : if a roleR has an event ε′′ that precedes
the claim , and starts with a read event, then there must be a preceding event on some other role. Because all roles
except for the claiming role start with a read, and role deﬁnitions are non-cyclic and ﬁnite, there must ultimately exist
an event ε′ of role role() that precedes ε′′, and thus we can conclude that LOOP(P, ) holds.
In practice, this lemma tells us that the LOOP property always holds for the initiating role of a protocol. Thus, we
only have to check whether the LOOP property holds for responder roles.
Now we can state a theorem, which provides a syntactic condition for the injectivity of a protocol that synchronises.
Theorem 2.
NI-SYNCH(P, ) ∧ LOOP(P, ) ⇒ I-SYNCH(P, ).
Proof. By contradiction. Assume that the implication does not hold. Thus, we have
NI-SYNCH(P, ) ∧ LOOP(P, ) ∧ ¬I-SYNCH(P, ). (8)
The remainder of the proof is done in two steps. The ﬁrst step of the proof establishes a trace t of the protocol, in which
there are two runs that synchronise with the same run. In the second step we use the shifting lemmas to transform t
into another trace of the protocol. For this new trace, we will show that NI-SYNCH cannot hold, which contradicts the
assumptions.
From now on, we will omit the type information for t and  in the quantiﬁers and assume that t ∈ Tr(P ).
Given that the protocol synchronises, but is not injective, we derive from Deﬁnitions 3 and 4 and formula (8) that
∀ t ∃ ∀c ∈ t : pe(c) =  ⇒ (t,, c) ∧ ¬∀t ∃ injective ∀c ∈ t : pe(c) =  ⇒ (t,, c). (9)
We push the negation on the right through the quantiﬁers, yielding
∀ t ∃ ∀c ∈ t : pe(c) =  ⇒ (t,, c) ∧ ∃t ∀¬( injective ∧ ∀c ∈ t : pe(c) =  ⇒ (t,, c)). (10)
Based on the existential quantiﬁers in (10), we choose a trace t and instantiation function  such that
∀ c ∈ t : pe(c) =  ⇒ (t,, c) ∧ ¬( injective ∧ ∀c ∈ t : pe(c) =  ⇒ (t,, c)). (11)
Note that in (11) the left conjunct also occurs as a sub-formula in the right conjunct. Rewriting yields
∀c ∈ t : pe(c) =  ⇒ (t,, c) ∧ ¬( injective). (12)
Making the non-injectivity for the function  explicit as explained in Deﬁnition 2, there must exist two claim events,
for which  holds:
∃ c1, c2, R1, R2 : (t,, c1) ∧ (t,, c2) ∧ (c1)(R1) = (c2)(R2) ∧ (c1 = c2 ∨ R1 = R2).
(13)
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From the predicate  and formula (13), we have that the run (c1)(R1) must be executing the role R1. Because
(c1)(R1) = (c2)(R2) it is also executing role R2. As deﬁned in Section 2, runs only execute a single role, and we
derive that R1 = R2. The fourth conjunct now reduces to c1 = c2.
Put R = R1 = R2. We choose two claim events c1, c2 such that formula (13) holds for R. Now there exists a trace
event set S such that
(c1)(R) = (c2)(R) = S.
From the deﬁnition of , we obtain that if R would be equal to role(), we would have S = c1 and S = c2, implying
c1 = c2 and contradicting Eq. (13). Thus, we have R = role().
We have now established that the trace t contains events from at least three role instances. Two of these, [c1] and
[c2], are executing the claim role, while the third, S is executing a different role R. Furthermore, we have that the
claims c1 and c2 synchronise with S.
This completes the ﬁrst step of the proof. We will now proceed by transforming t into a trace for which NI-SYNCH
cannot hold, for the second part of the proof.
Because we have (t,, c1) and (t,, c2), on the basis of Lemma 2 we can apply shift using c1 and c2 to get a
trace t ′ ∈ Tr(P )
t ′ = shift(′(t,, c1) ∪ ′(t,, c2), t).
In the trace t ′ we now have two distinct segments. All events involved with the synchronisation of c1 and c2 are now
in the initial segment of t ′. This includes the events of S that precede the claim. The second segment of t ′ contains all
other events, which are not involved in the preceding events of c1 and c2.
We will now reorder the initial segment of t ′. To this end, we apply the shift function a second time, now only for c1.
This will also yield a trace of the protocol, because the conditions of Lemma 2 hold for t ′, as the application of shift
to t maintained the order of the events in the shifted set, which implies that (t ′,, c1) holds. Thus, we also know that
the trace t ′′ is an element of Tr(P ), where
t ′′ = shift(′(t ′,, c1), t ′)
Because the shift function maintains the order of the involved events, we have that t ′′ = u1; u2; u3, where
set(u1)= ′(t ′,, c1),
set(u2)= ′(t,, c2) \ ′(t ′,, c1).
All events that are not involved with the synchronisation claims c1 and c2, are in u3.
Observe that u1 includes all events of S that are involved with the claim of the run c1. As all events are unique, these
are not part of u2. From the construction of the involved events set, we know that all involved events of role R are also
in S, because all other role instances are executing other roles (as indicated by ). This implies that there are no events
of role R in the u2 segment at all: these are all in u1.
Now we have arrived at a contradiction. t ′′ is in the set Tr(P ). The loop property combined with NI-SYNCH requires
that for each role, there is an event after the ﬁrst event of the claim role, that occurs before the claim. For the run c2 all
events are in u2 (including the start and the claim), but in this segment there is no event of role R. Thus, there can be
no  for t ′′ such that (t ′′,, c2) holds. This implies that NI-SYNCH does not hold for the protocol, which contradicts
the assumptions. 
Thus, we have established that LOOP is a sufﬁcient condition to guarantee injectivity for protocols that satisfy
NI-SYNCH.
5. Related work
Historically,many different interpretations of authentication exist. Herewe focus on authentication of communication
protocols. Early authentication concepts simply mention that one “end” of the channel can assure itself regarding the
identity of the other end, as in e.g. [25,26]. An identity is considered to be an “end”. These concepts seem very
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similar to Lowe’s deﬁnition of aliveness in [22]. For this form of authentication, it is only required that the party to
be authenticated performs some action to prove his identity (i.e. applying his secret key) regardless of the context, or
whom he is proving his identity to. This is a rather weak form of authentication.
Some more advanced notions of authentication can be found in [19], for example, where mechanisms are sketched to
prevent message stream modiﬁcation. This can be prevented by achieving three subgoals: determine message authen-
ticity, integrity, and ordering. Although no formalisation is provided, this concept is akin to our notion of non-injective
synchronisation.
The international standard ISO/IEC 9798-1 [16] states that authentication requires veriﬁcation of an entity’s claimed
identity. In response, Gollmann points out in [13] that the concept of a sender of a message should be treated with
caution, and that replays should be prevented. Gollmann argues that authentication of an entire communication session
is done by ﬁrst setting up a session key, and that further messages are authenticated on the basis of this key. Based on this
assumption, four authentication goals are identiﬁed. These goals explicitly assume that the protocols are implemented
using private keys and session keys. Our deﬁnition of injective synchronisation is independent of protocol details,
though. Therefore, it can be applied to a wider range of protocols.
An alternative formulation of authentication is given by Difﬁe et al. in [8]. Here, participants are required to have
matchingmessage histories. Themessage history is allowed to be partial, if the lastmessage sent is never received,which
corresponds to our notion of messages that causally precede a claim. This notion corresponds closely to non-injective
agreement.
As mentioned in the introduction, Roscoe introduces in [27] intensional speciﬁcations. These can be viewed as
authentication of communications. The notion of injectivity does not seem to play a role in Roscoe’s deﬁnition. Besides
further research by Roscoe et al., there have been few attempts at formalising intensional forms of authentication.
A notable exception is the deﬁnition of authentication by Adi et al. in [2]. Their authentication property requires a strict
order on the messages. Furthermore, injectivity of the runs is required.
The authentication deﬁnition of [2] differs from injective synchronisation on twomain points. First, it has a parameter,
consisting of the set of communications to be authenticated. In our work, this parameter is ﬁxed: it is deﬁned as the
set of communications that causally precede the claim event. We argue that this choice results in the strongest possible
form of authentication. If the parameter is chosen to be a proper subset of the causally preceding communications set,
it can be shown that the authentication is strictly weaker than injective synchronisation for the normal intruder model.
On the other hand, if the parameter includes a communication that does not causally precede the claim, authentication
will not hold for any protocol in all execution models that allow agents to abort runs, or that allow the network to
delay messages. A second difference is that the authentication deﬁnition is strictly tailored for protocols involving
two parties that communicate directly with each other. Thus, it cannot straightforwardly be used to express that two
parties authenticate each other when they only communicate via e.g. a server. Also, it is not clear how it generalises to
multi-party settings.
In [22], Lowe introduces an entire hierarchy of extensional speciﬁcations, corresponding to authentication of
data. This builds on earlier work of [8] and [13], resulting in four different forms of authentication, viz. alive-
ness, weak agreement, non-injective agreement and injective agreement. On top of this, agreement on subsets of
data items and recentness are considered (two topics we do not address here). In the course of time many sub-
tly different extensional authentication properties have been proposed. Most of these derive directly from the work
by Lowe.
In [4], Boyd proposes an alternative hierarchy of extensional goals for authentication protocols, which are oriented
towards goals regarding established keys as well as the end results for the user. Similar to Gollmann, Boyd assumes
that authentication is comprised of session key establishment and further communications being authenticated through
the use of this key.
Authentication and agreement are also studied in [11] by Focardi and Martinelli in the context of the so-called
GNDC scheme. In a process algebra extended with inference systems reﬂecting cryptographic actions, one can reduce
reasoning about security properties with respect to any arbitrary environment to the analysis of the behaviour of the
security protocol in the most general environment. It is argued that the GNDC scheme is valid for establishing various
security properties, in particular agreement (as well as its weaker variants). In [10], Focardi andMartinelli recast Lowe’s
notion of agreement in the GNDC scheme, and show that it is strictly stronger than two other notions of authentication:
GNDC-authentication and spi-authentication from [1]. This implies that the latter two notions are also strictly weaker
than injective synchronisation.
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With respect to the analysis and veriﬁcation of injectivity, we note that most approaches implement Lowe’s deﬁnition
of injectivity by way of a counting strategy: in any possible execution of the protocol, the number of initiator runs may
not exceed the number of corresponding responder runs. This counting argument can easily be used in amodel-checking
approach. Indeed, this is how injectivity is veriﬁed in the Casper/FDR tool chain [21,28]. Since it is only possible to
model a ﬁnite and ﬁxed number of scenarios, this approach will only provide an approximation of injectivity. Other
approaches to the veriﬁcation of security protocols, e.g. those based on logics (such as [5]) or on term rewriting (such
as [12]) do not consider injectivity. The Strand Spaces [31] approach does not provide formal means to deal with
injectivity. Instead, it is proposed to check authentication based on nonces, for example by using so-called solicited
authentication tests as deﬁned in [15]. These tests guarantee injectivity, based on nonce freshness. Authentication and
injectivity are strongly connected in this view. In the HLPSL framework used by the Avispa tool set [9], injectivity of
a data item is veriﬁed by ensuring that it is not replayed. If the correct data items are chosen, this can be used to verify
that injective agreement holds.
We mention two examples of security protocol formalisms that deal explicitly with injectivity. Gordon and Jeffrey
have devised a method [18] to verify injective correspondence relations for the -calculus. This method allows for
veriﬁcation by type-checking of (injective) correspondences. A second example can be found in the protocol logic by
Adi et al. [2], where pattern matching is used to express injectivity for two-party protocols. However, it is not clear
how veriﬁcation can be done efﬁciently.
6. Conclusions
In this section we summarise the main contributions of our research and discuss some directions for future work.
First of all, we have deﬁned a general trace model for security protocols which allows for the deﬁnition of security
properties in an intensional style. This model is not tied to a particular semantics, making it independent of e.g. the
execution model of an agent and the intruder model. The starting point of the model is a role-based protocol description,
where security claims are local to the protocol roles. Such a subjective security claim expresses what an agent may
safely assume after having executed his part of the protocol. The main motivation for developing the model was to
study synchronisation and agreement in an abstract setting, allowing us to pinpoint what the exact differences are. To
this end, we formalised two forms of agreement: injective and non-injective agreement over all variables and all roles.
Due to the uniform phrasing, the two notions of authentication can be distinguished easily: agreement allows that an
intruder injects a (correct and expected) message before it is sent by the originator of the message. As for agreement,
we provide both an injective and a non-injective variant of synchronisation.
Our deﬁnitions of synchronisation and agreement abstract away from the protocol and the semantic model as much
as possible, e.g. they do not refer to the details of the message elements. Given a trace, we only need to have an equality
relation between the contents of send and read events, and to know the ordering of the events in a protocol description, in
order to be able to verify every formof authentication deﬁnedhere. This contrastswith other deﬁnitions of authentication,
where often much more information about the protocol and its semantics is required to verify authentication for a given
trace. In fact, for our approach, the deﬁnitions do not even require a trace semantics or a full ordering on the events
within a role. The deﬁnitions will also work with the partially-ordered structures of the Strand Spaces model of [31],
but also with the preorder on the events of a role of the AVISPA model in [9]; the only requirement on the role event
order is that each event must have a ﬁnite set of preceding events.
From the deﬁnitions of synchronisation and agreement, we construct a hierarchy of authentication properties depicted
in Fig. 2. We show that with respect to the Dolev–Yao intruder model, injective synchronisation is strictly stronger than
injective agreement.
For the abstract model, we have only included those elements that are necessary to explain synchronisation. If this
model is extended to a full semantics, as we did in e.g. [7], formal proofs that security protocols satisfy synchronisation
can be constructed.
Theorem 2 states that, for a large class of security protocol models, injectivity of authentication protocols is easy
to verify, once synchronisation has been established. Until now, injectivity and authentication have been strongly
connected. Our new results establish that it sufﬁces to verify the non-injective variant of synchronisation. Verifying
injectivity is a simple and separate task, which does not depend on any speciﬁc (data) model.
For our injectivity result, we did not choose a speciﬁc security protocol model. Instead, as already mentioned, we
have characterised a class of models in which Theorem 2 holds. This class contains nearly all models found in the
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Fig. 9. A unilateral agreement protocol, with LOOP, but not injective.
literature, such as the Strand Spaces model, Casper/FDR without time, and term rewrite systems [31,21,12], as well as
manymodels that allow for non-linear (branching) protocol speciﬁcations. Thesemodels share the following properties:
(i) Multiple instances of the protocol are truly independent. They do not share variables, memory, or time.
(ii) The intruder has the ability to duplicatemessages, as holds, for example, in the standardDolev–Yao intrudermodel.
The question arises whether the theorem also holds in an intruder-less model. This is in fact the case, but of less interest,
because injectivity always holds for synchronising or agreeing protocols when there is no intruder.
Automated veriﬁcation of the LOOP property can be implemented easily. We are currently working on an extension
of the Scyther tool [6]. The algorithm is an instance of the reachability problem in a ﬁnite acyclic graph, and therefore,
has linear complexity.
Almost all correct authentication protocols in the literature satisfy NI-SYNCH as well as LOOP. It seems that LOOP
is a necessary condition for injectivity.We know that this holds for the Dolev–Yao intrudermodel. However, for peculiar
intruder models, LOOP is not a necessary condition for injectivity.
In the models where LOOP is also a necessary condition for injectivity, our results imply a minimum number of
messages in a multi-party authentication protocol. We will investigate this in future work.
The LOOP property guarantees injectivity for synchronising protocols. This raises the question whether there is a
similar property to show injectivity of agreeing protocols. It can be seen from the example in Fig. 9, that LOOP does
not sufﬁce to guarantee injectivity. The protocol satisﬁes the loop property for the claim role, and the protocol satisﬁes
non-injective agreement, but not injective agreement. Finding an alternative for agreeing protocols is an interesting
challenge for future research.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers whose helpful comments have improved this paper.
References
[1] M. Abadi, A.D. Gordon, A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus, Inform. and Comput. 148 (1) (1999) 1–70.
[2] K. Adi, M. Debbabi, M. Mejri, A new logic for electronic commerce protocols, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 291 (2003) 223–283.
[3] A. Armando, D. Basin, Y. Boichut, Y. Chevalier, L. Compagna, L. Cuellar, P.H. Drielsma, P. Heám, O. Kouchnarenko, J. Mantovani,
S. Mödersheim, D. von Oheimb, M. Rusinowitch, J. Santiago, M. Turuani, L. Viganò, L. Vigneron, The AVISPA tool for the automated
validation of internet security protocols and applications. in: Proc. of CAV’2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 3576, Springer,
Berlin, 2005, pp. 281–285,
[4] C. Boyd. Towards extensional goals in authentication protocols, in: Proc. DIMACS Workshop on Design and Formal Veriﬁcation of Security
Protocols, 1997.
[5] M. Burrows, M. Abadi, R.M. Needham, A logic of authentication, ACM Trans. Comput. Systems 8 (1990) 16–36.
[6] C.J.F. Cremers, Scyther documentation, 2004 〈 http://www.win.tue.nl/∼ccremers/scyther〉.
[7] C.J.F. Cremers, S. Mauw, Operational semantics of security protocols, in: S. Leue, T. Systä (Eds.), Scenarios: Models, Transformations and
Tools, InternationalWorkshop, Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, September 7–12, 2003, Revised Selected Papers, LectureNotes in Computer Science,
Vol. 3466, Springer, Berlin, 2005.
[8] W. Difﬁe, P.C. van Oorschot, M.J. Wiener, Authentication and authenticated key-exchanges, Des. Codes Cryptogr. 2 (1992) 107–125.
C.J.F. Cremers et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 139–161 161
[9] FET Open Project IST-2001-39252. AVISPA: Automated validation of internet security protocols and applications, 2003, 〈http://www.
avispa-project.org/〉.
[10] R. Focardi, R. Gorrieri, F. Martinelli, A comparison of three authentication properties, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 291 (3) (2003) 285–327.
[11] R. Focardi, F. Martinelli, A uniform approach for the deﬁnition of security properties, in: World Congr. on Formal Methods, Vol. 1, 1999,
pp. 794–813.
[12] T. Genet, F. Klay, Rewriting for cryptographic protocol veriﬁcation, in: Conf. on Automated Deduction, Lecture Notes on Artiﬁcial Intelligence,
Vol. 1831, 2000, pp. 271–290.
[13] D. Gollmann, What do we mean by entity authentication, in Proc. Symp. on Research in Security and Privacy, IEEE, New York, 1996,
pp. 46–54.
[14] L. Gong, Variations on the themes of message freshness and replay—or the difﬁculty of devising formal methods to analyze cryptographic
protocols, in: Proc. Computer Security Foundations Workshop VI, IEEE Computer Society Press, Silver Spring, MD, 1993, pp. 131–136.
[15] J.D. Guttman, F.J. Thayer, Authentication tests and the structure of bundles, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 283 (2) (2002) 333–380.
[16] International Organization for Standardization, Information technology–security techniques–entity authentication—Part 1: General model,
ISO/IEC 9798-1, September 1991.
[17] ITU-TS, Recommendation Z.120: Message Sequence Chart (MSC), ITU-TS, Geneva, 1999.
[18] A. Jeffrey, A. Gordon, Typing one-to-one and one-to-many correspondences in security protocols. in: M. Okada, B.C. Pierce, A. Scedrov,
H. Tokuda, A. Yonezawa (Eds.), Proc. of ISSS ’02, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 2514, 2002, pp. 418–434.
[19] S.T. Kent, Encryption-based protection for interactive user/computer communication, in: SIGCOMM’77 Proc. Fifth Symposium on Data
Communications, NY, USA, 1977, ACM Press, New York, pp. 5.7–5.13.
[20] G. Lowe, Breaking and ﬁxing the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR, in: T. Margaria, B. Steffen (Eds.), Proc. of TACAS ’96,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1055, 1996, pp. 147–166.
[21] G. Lowe, Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols, in: Proc. of CSFW ’97, Rockport, IEEE, New York, 1997, pp. 18–30.
[22] G. Lowe, A hierarchy of authentication speciﬁcations, in: Proc. of CSFW ’97, Rockport, IEEE, New York, 1997, pp. 31–44.
[23] S. Malladi, J. Alves-Foss, R. Heckendorn, On preventing replay attacks on security protocols, in: Proc. Internat. Conf. on Security and
Management, CSREA Press, 2002, pp. 77–83.
[24] C.J. Mitchell, L. Chen, Comments on the s/key user authentication scheme, SIGOPS Oper. Systems Rev. 30 (4) (1996) 12–16.
[25] R. Needham, M. Schroeder, Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers, Commun. ACM 21 (1978) 120–126.
[26] G.J. Popek, C.S. Kline, Encryption and secure computer networks, ACM Comput. Survey 11 (4) (1979) 331–356.
[27] A.W. Roscoe, Intensional Speciﬁcations of Security Protocols, in: Proc. of CSFW ’96, IEEE, New York, 1996, pp. 28–38.
[28] P. Ryan, S. Schneider, M. Goldsmith, G. Lowe, B. Roscoe, Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols, Addison Wesley, Reading, MA,
2000.
[29] Security protocols open repository, 〈http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore〉.
[30] D. Song, Athena: a new efﬁcient automatic checker for security protocol analysis, in: Proc. CSFW ’99, Mordano, IEEE, New York, 1999,
p. 192.
[31] F.J. Thayer, J.C. Herzog, J.D. Guttman, Strand spaces: why is a security protocol correct, in: Proc. Symp. on Security and Privacy, Oakland,
IEEE, New York, 1998, pp. 160–171.
